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Amina Bi Kaskar (D) Thr.Lr vs Union Of India

Supreme Court20 April 2018Abhay Manohar Sapre · R.K. Agrawal

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an appellate authority or tribunal has jurisdiction to condone delay in filing appeals only up to a specified outer limit (here, 60 days from service of the order), and an appeal is filed beyond that limit, the authority has no power to condone the delay and must dismiss the appeal as barred by limitation, provided the appellant's own admission establishes that he had knowledge of the order within the prescribed period. When an appellant admits having knowledge of an order within the prescribed limitation period, any alleged irregularity in the manner of service of that order is immaterial and cannot cure the fundamental defect of the appeal being filed beyond the outer limit of the condonation period.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4252 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.34261 of 2012]

Amina Bi Kaskar (D) Thr. Lr. .. Appellant(s)

Versus

Union of India & Ors. .. Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4253 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.34647 of 2012]

JUDGMENT

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date: 2018.04.20

2) These appeals have been filed against the final 15:42:26 IST Reason:

judgment and order dated 27.09.2012 passed by the

1 High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in L.P.A. Nos.656

and 657 of 2011 whereby the Division Bench of the

High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the

appellants herein and upheld the order dated

14.07.2011 passed by the Single Judge in W.P. [C]

1426 & 1439/1999.

3) The issue involved in these appeals is short and

it relates to the question as to whether the Tribunal

was justified in dismissing the appellants’ appeals as

being barred by time and was justified in holding that

there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay

in filing the appeals and secondly, whether the High

Court was justified in upholding the order of the

Tribunal.

4) Few relevant facts need to be mentioned to

appreciate the short controversy.

5) An order was passed by the Competent

Authority under Section 7 of the Smugglers and

2 Foreign Exchange Manipulators (forfeiture of

Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as

“SAFEMA”) against the appellants on 14.07.1998 and

14.10.1998 in relation to their properties.

6) The appellants felt aggrieved of the

aforementioned orders and filed appeals on

20.10.1998 under Section 12(4) of SAFEMA before

the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property, New

Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”).

7) The limitation to file an appeal before the

Tribunal is 45 days from the date of the service of the

order as prescribed under SAFEMA. However, if the

appeal is filed beyond the period of 45 days then on

sufficient cause being shown, the Appellate Authority

is empowered to condone the delay in filing the

appeal only up to 60 days but not beyond the period

of 60 days.

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8) In this case, the appeals were filed beyond the

period of 60 days, i.e., the appeals were filed on 81 st

day after the service of the order. The appellants,

therefore, filed application for condonation of delay in

the appeals alleging therein that there was a

sufficient cause in filing the appeals beyond the

period of limitation.

9) The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as being

barred by time. In other words, the Tribunal was of

the view that even, according to the appellants’ own

version mentioned in the appeals’ memo, there was

no sufficient cause made out for condoning the delay.

It was also held that since the appeals were filed

beyond 60 days, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to

condone such delay.

10) In other words, it was held that the power to

condone the delay in filing the appeal is only when

the appeal is filed beyond 45 days but not beyond 60

4 days. Since in this case, the appeals were filed on 81 st

day, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the

delay beyond the period of 60 th day. The Tribunal,

therefore, did not find any apparent error to review

their order in the absence of any power to review and

further any error to rectify such order.

11) The appellants, felt aggrieved by the order of the

Tribunal, filed writ petition under Article 226/227 of

the Constitution before the High Court. By order

dated 14.07.2011/27.07.2011, Single Judge of the

High Court dismissed the petitions.

12) Against the order of the Single Judge, the

appellants filed intra court appeals. By impugned

judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court

dismissed the appeals and affirmed the order passed

by the Single Judge which has given rise to filing of

the present appeals by way of special leave in this

Court.

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13) Heard Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior

counsel for the appellants and Mr. K.

Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel for the

respondents.

14) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

at length and on perusal of the record of the case, we

find no merit in the appeals.

15) In our opinion, when even according to the

appellants, the orders impugned in the appeals

before the Tribunal were served on them on 29/30 th

July 1998, then in such event, the question as to the

manner in which the service was effected and

whether it was in accordance with the procedure

prescribed under Section 22 of SAFEMA has no

significance and really does not arise for

consideration.

16) We, however, consider it apposite to reproduce

Para 3 of the impugned judgment for perusal:

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“Some facts would be necessary to decide these appeals. The competent authority under SAFEMA passed an order dated 14.07.1998 for forfeiture of several properties under Section 7 of SAFEMA. The common appeal filed on behalf of the appellants was beyond the period of 60 days from the passing of the order dated 14.07.1998 by the competent authority. We may point out, at this stage, that the appellants had admitted in their said appeal before the Tribunal that the order dated 14.07.1998 was served upon them on 29/30th July, 1998. This admission has clearly been made in paragraph 3 as well as paragraph 8 of the appeal. The clear admission was to the following effect:

‘that the said order dated 14.07.1998 was received by the appellant sometime around 29-30th of July, 1998’.

A condonation of delay application was also filed alongwith the said appeal before the said Tribunal. Paragraph 4 of the said condonation of delay application reads as under:

“The impugned order dated 14.07.1998, was served on the appellant on 29/30th July, 1998, and the appellant should have preferred an appeal within 45 days therefrom. The appellants are illiterate and paradanashini widows and the appellant No. 1 has the duty of bringing up for minor children and an ailing aged mother who is appellant No. 2 in addition to other social obligations.”

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17) In the light of the aforementioned finding of fact

recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High

Court, we do not consider it necessary to examine the

question though vehemently argued by Dr. Rajeev

Dhavan, learned senior counsel for the appellants,

namely, whether in a given case service of the order

on the appellants’ lawyer is proper or not and

whether the service on the appellants’ minor

daughter was in accordance with the procedure

prescribed under Section 22 of SAFEMA or not.

18) If the appellants had the knowledge of the order

passed against them and which they admit to have as

per their own admission mentioned above, pursuant

to which they filed appeals, then in our opinion, so

called irregularity in the manner of effecting the

service of the order on them etc. was of no

consequence and cannot be termed as illegal per se

(if found to exist though denied by the Revenue).

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19) In the light of the foregoing discussion, the

decisions cited by learned senior counsel in Kuntesh

Gupta Dr.(Smt.) vs. Management of Hindu Kanya

Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur(U.P.) & Ors., 1987 (4) SCC

525, Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. Competent

Authority, 1997 (11) SCC 421, Chingleput Bottlers

vs. Majestic Bottling Co., AIR 1984 SC1030 and

Attorney General For India & Ors. vs. Amartlal

Prajivandas & Ors., 1994 (5) SCC 54 are

distinguishable on facts.

20) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered view that the Tribunal, Single Judge and

Division Bench of the High Court were right in

dismissing the appeals as being barred by limitation

holding that there was no sufficient cause in filing

the appeals beyond the period of limitation and that

the Tribunal did not have power to condone the delay

beyond 60 days.

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21) This being a finding of fact in a given case and

apart from it, neither being illegal and nor perverse,

we do not find any good ground to interfere in such

finding and accordingly uphold the same.

22) The appeals thus fail and are accordingly

dismissed.

………………………………..J (R.K. AGRAWAL)

…..………………………………J. (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE) New Delhi, April 20, 2018

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