All India Judges Association vs Union Of India

2025 INSC 1328 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

I.A. NO. 230675/2025

IN

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1022 OF 1989

All India Judges Association and Ors. …Petitioners

Versus

Union of India and Ors. …Respondents

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. The instant Interlocutory Application seeks to

revisit the principles governing the determination of

seniority within the cadre of Higher Judicial Services

(HJS) of all the States. This controversy is neither novel

nor transient; rather, it represents a recurring dilemma

that has, from time to time, engaged the attention of this Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by

Court.

DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2025.11.19 12:18:51 IST Reason:

Page 1 of 59

I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

2. To briefly outline the factual context herein, the

HJS, across the country, is comprised of officers

recruited through three sources: (i) Regular Promotees

(RP); (ii) those promoted through the Limited

Departmental Competitive Examinations (LDCE); and

(iii) Direct Recruits (DR). These three sources for

recruitment and appointment to the position of District

Judge were crystallised through various directions

issued in the successive All India Judges Association

(AIJA) proceedings. It is amongst these three sources

that the dispute of inter se seniority has arisen.

3. Over the course of many decades, divergent

approaches have been adopted in an endeavour to

reconcile competing claims between different streams of

appointment, reflecting this Court’s continued attempt

to bring coherence and uniformity to this enduring

issue.

4. This question has once again fallen before us for

consideration in light of an interlocutory application,

Page 2 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 being I.A. No. 230675 of 2025, filed by learned Amicus

Curiae (Mr Siddharth Bhatnagar, Senior Advocate) in the

lead case. Notice was accordingly issued in respect of

this application on 17.09.2025.

5. Having regard to the fact that the aforesaid

application brought to light an ‘anomalous situation’

pertaining to the inter se seniority between District

Judges (Direct Recruits) and District Judges

(Promotees), this Court, vide order dated 07.10.2025,

was pleased to record as follows:

“2. This Court, vide order dated 17th September, 2025, had considered an application filed by Shri. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned amicus curiae, who had pointed out an anomalous situation viz., in most of the states, judicial officers recruited as Civil Judge (‘CJ’) often do not reach the level of Principal District Judge (‘PDJ’), leave aside reaching the position of a High Court Judge. This has resulted in many bright young lawyers being dissuaded from joining the service at the level of CJ.

….

10. It cannot be disputed that the judges who were initially appointed as CJ gain rich experience since they have been serving in the judiciary for a number of decades.

Page 3 of 59

I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Furthermore, every judicial officer, be it one who was initially recruited as CJ or one who was directly recruited as a District Judge, has an aspiration to reach at least up to the position of a High Court Judge.

11. We are, therefore, of the view that a proper balance has to be struck between the competing claims. However, this issue would involve consideration of some of the judgments and orders passed by Benches comprising of three learned judges of this Court. Therefore, in order to put the entire controversy at rest and provide a meaningful and long-lasting solution, we are of the considered view that it will be appropriate if the issue is considered by a Constitution Bench consisting of five learned Judges of this Court.

12. We, therefore, direct the Registrar (Judicial) to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India, on the administrative side for obtaining appropriate orders.”

6. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India thereafter

directed that the matter be placed before a 5-Judge

Bench. The matter was accordingly taken up on

14.10.2025, whereupon the limited question requiring

consideration was delineated as follows:

“What should be the criteria for determining seniority in the cadre of Higher Judicial Services”

Page 4 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 COMPETING VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS

7. As already mentioned heretofore, the learned

Amicus, through the captioned application, underscored

certain issues pervading inter se seniority in the HJS.

8. Although the objective of the application was

initially to embellish, enliven, and enrich the District

Judiciary by balancing both merit and practical

experience, it has presently been prompted by a

perceived discontentment and heartburn amongst those

recruited to the lower rungs of the judiciary.

9. The malady of disproportionate progression within

the HJS has been observed by this Court in previous

AIJA proceedings and was also noted with concern by

the First National Judicial Pay Commission under the

Chairmanship of Justice K.J. Shetty, a former Judge of

this Court (Shetty Commission).

10. In this vein, as a workable outcome to improve the

position of the RPs and LDCEs and considering the

Page 5 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 recommendations of the Shetty Commission, the Amicus

put forth four proposals:

i. A 1:1 quota should be prescribed for appointment

to Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within the

HJS;

ii. The zone of consideration for upgradation to

Selection Grade and Super Time Scale should

comprise equal numbers of DRs and promotees

(RPs and LDCEs combined), without any

prescription regarding the actual selections;

iii. Providing one year seniority for every five years of

completed service within the lower rungs of the

judicial service, subject to a maximum of three

years, which is an attempt to revive the

recommendation of the Shetty Commission; or

iv. Creating three separate seniority lists within the

HJS, on the basis of source of recruitment, in the

Page 6 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 ratio of 50:25:25, as recommended by the High

Court of Andhra Pradesh.

11. Thereupon, responses were filed by States / Union

Territories Administrations, as well as the Registrar

Generals of various High Courts and other stakeholders

comprising detailed submissions regarding the rules

existing in their respective States for the career

progression of Judicial Officers appointed or promoted

from the aforementioned three sources.

12. On the one hand, the RPs through their learned

counsels, raised cudgels against DRs on the grounds of

an advantage being conferred upon them by virtue of

their relatively younger age at the time of entering into

the HJS. Their contentions have been briefly

summarized hereinbelow:

i. The age advantage enjoyed by DRs enables their

progress to the Selection Grade and the Super

Time Scale, as well as taking on administrative

Page 7 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 roles in Districts, and ultimately, being elevated

to the High Court;

ii. Experience in judicial service is superior to

experience at the Bar, and there should be

recognition of prior judicial service in the posts of

Civil Judge-Junior Division

(Munsiff/Magistrates) and Civil Judge-Senior

Division (Sub Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrates),

whether they are promoted to the HJS from the

RP or LDCE cadres. Reliance was placed in this

regard on the decision in Rejanish K.V. v K.

Deepa1;

iii. ‘Heartburn’ is caused by the induction of younger

candidates as DRs and their consequential

career progression, which diminishes the

consideration of the efforts of judicial officers who

have toiled endlessly in their judicial work for

long years.

Page 8 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

13. Similarly, those representing the LDCEs, while

largely adopting the arguments raised by the RPs, also

sought to bring forward certain issues distinct to them:

i. Earlier judicial service ought to be reckoned in

the same manner for both RPs and LDCEs;

ii. If sufficient candidates are not found through

LDCE in a recruitment year, the vacancies

should not be filled by RPs but should be carried

forward. In such a scenario, the passed-over

seniority ought to be conferred in the successive

selection;

iii. The position on the roster should be preserved

even if there aren’t sufficient vacancies available

in any given year.

14. On the contrary, the learned counsels representing

DRs argued that there is no pressing need for this Court

to create any favourable systems so as to promote RPs

Page 9 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 and LDCEs. In this regard, the following submissions

were adduced:

i. The available data clearly shows that the

situation pertaining to inter se seniority varies

across different States, with some States where

the DRs hold more prominent positions, while in

others, the RPs have an advantage over the DRs;

ii. The High Courts, being conferred with the power

to regulate, inter alia, the inter se seniority within

the Judicial Services, are better equipped to

determine the issue on the basis of the statistics

and features intrinsic to a particular State

Judicial Service, as well as to determine the inter

se seniority within the cadre of District Judges;

iii. Upon entry into the HJS, the source of

recruitment becomes inconsequential, and the

service rendered in the feeder category pales into

insignificance. When seniority of the incumbents

in a particular recruitment year is adjusted as

Page 10 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 per the roster system providing proportional

representation to RPs, LDCEs and DRs, such

seniority on entry continues and the birthmark

of the source from which they were recruited is

no more relevant for further career advancement

within the cadre by way of fixation in the higher

grades or designation for the discharge of

administrative duties.

iv. The position on the roster should be preserved

even if there are not sufficient vacancies available

in any given year.

15. Additionally, several High Courts were represented

before this Court by learned senior counsel, whose

submissions broadly aligned with one or the other set of

arguments addressed. As these submissions have

already been duly adverted to hereinabove, we do not

consider it necessary to reiterate them.

16. What is of greater significance, however, is that the

said counsel extended valuable assistance by placing

Page 11 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 before us relevant statistics and prevailing

circumstances, thereby illuminating the range of

possible approaches available to this Court for resolving

the present issue.

ANALYSIS

17. As we turn to scrutinizing and appraising the

singular issue at hand, we deem it appropriate to clarify

at the very outset that there can be no separate quota

insofar as the recommendations for elevation to the High

Court are concerned. We say so, being especially mindful

of the truism that such processes are neither promotions

nor a fixation for financial upgradation or career

advancement.

I. Power of this Court re: seniority within the HJS

THE SUCCESSIVE AIJA PROCEEDINGS

18. At this juncture, it is imperative to address the

specific plea raised by various parties before us that this

Court, in view of the powers granted to the High Court

under Articles 233 to 235, should restrain itself from

Page 12 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 issuing mandatory guidelines on the rules governing the

service of judicial officers.

19. In consideration thereof, we must first trace the

trajectory of the AIJA proceedings before this Court.

20. The captioned Writ Petition was filed in the year

1989 and has been retained in this Court as a measure

of ongoing mandamus, to safeguard the independence of

the judiciary—a basic structure of the Constitution as

held by this Court—and to effectively serve the efficient

administration of justice.

21. In the All India Judges' Association v. Union of

India2 (First AIJA), this Court addressed: (i) the

establishment of an All India Judicial Service; (ii)

uniformity in the designation of judicial officers, both on

the criminal and civil side, across the Country; (iii)

retirement age of judicial officers to be stipulated as 60

years; (iv) consideration of appropriate pay scales; (v) a

working library and provision for sumptuary allowance;

(vi) residential accommodation to be provided by the

Page 13 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 State Government; (vii) adequate transport facilities;

and (viii) establishment of institutions for in-service

training.

22. All of these aspects were articulated to establish a

status for the judicial service that aligns with the

assigned judicial duties, maintaining the principle of

separation of powers and safeguarding the

independence of the judiciary. This idea was further

supported by creating a supportive working environment

free from the burdens of mundane routines and the

challenges of maintaining a work-life balance.

23. Although directions were issued on all these

aspects, a review was filed, leading to the judgment in

All India Judges' Association v. Union of India 3

(Second AIJA), where some modifications were made;

the most significant being the requirement of three

years' practice as a mandatory and essential

qualification for recruitment to judicial posts at the lower

rungs in the judicial hierarchy, and the weeding out of

Page 14 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 dead wood at an age prior to the stipulation of 60 years

as the common age of superannuation.

24. The directions put forth in the First AIJA2 were

essentially affirmed in all respects in the Second AIJA3,

except for the direction for grant of sumptuary as well as

residence-cum-library allowances, which stood

withdrawn subject to fulfilment of certain conditions.

Essentially, the directions issued, as already

highlighted, aimed to accord a special status to judicial

officers who, in their role of dispensing justice, occupy a

position that is both demanding and unique; and stands

in contrast to other State services, given that their

independence is a fundamental aspect of the

Constitution, as held by this Court.

25. Thereafter, in the All India Judges' Association

v. Union of India4 (Third AIJA), this Court specifically

examined the clarification sought by the State of Kerala

and found that the five years of legal practice prescribed

as the minimum qualification for appointment to the

Page 15 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 lower rung of the judicial service in that State, to be

perfectly in order, since the direction in the Second

AIJA3 aimed to establish a minimum essential

qualification of three years’ practice.

26. While reaffirming the requirement of at least three

years’ practice for recruitment to the lowest rung of

judicial office, it was also determined that a by-transfer

appointment to the cadre of Munsif-Magistrates from the

ministerial and gazetted staff of the district judiciary and

the High Court was bad because it did not meet the

minimum requirement of three years’ practice at the bar.

27. In All India Judges' Association v. Union of

India5 (Fourth AIJA), the requirement of a minimum

experience at the Bar was dispensed with, finding fresh

graduates also eligible to offer themselves for

recruitment to the lower rungs of the judiciary,

especially in the context of a mandatory training period

of one year having been provided. Further, a faster

promotional opportunity was provided for the judicial

Page 16 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 officers in the lower rungs by prescribing an LDCE. It

was also directed that for proportional representation of

the RPs, LDCEs and DRs, a ratio of 50:25:25 would be

applied to the cadre of District Judges; the seniority at

the entry point in the HJS being determined on a 40-

point roster as approved by this Court in R.K.

Sabharwal & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.6

28. Later, in the year 2010, in All India Judges Assn.

v. Union of India7 (Fifth AIJA), having realised that a

large number of vacancies in the 25% LDCE category

remained unfilled, the said quota itself was reduced to

10%. A ratio of 65:10:25, respectively, for the RPs,

LDCEs and DRs, was thus prescribed for recruitment to

the cadre of District Judges.

29. This ratio has, however, been once again modified

this year itself in 2025 in the All India Judges

Association v. Union of India8 (Sixth AIJA) to

50:25:25, also revamping and expanding the framework

for accelerated promotion from Junior Division to Senior

Page 17 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Division and thereafter to the HJS. As of date, the

decision of this Court in Rejanish K.V1 has further

enabled the service of judicial officers to be reckoned for

the purpose of direct recruitment to the HJS through

participation in the direct recruitment examinations.

30. The series of AIJA decisions thus acknowledges

and recognises the fact that in a democracy, the role of

the judiciary is truly indispensable. For the efficient

functioning of the Rule of Law and to ensure that our

democracy prospers, it is de reiguer that we nurture an

efficient, strong, and enlightened judiciary.

HIGH COURT AS A REPOSITORY OF POWERS

31. At the same time, we are also cognizant of the wide-

ranging powers and general superintendence vested

with each High Court regarding the judicial services,

within the respective States / Union Territories.

32. To understand the width of these powers, one need

not look beyond the decisions of two Constitution

Page 18 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Benches of this Court in B.S. Yadav v. State of

Haryana9 and State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah10.

33. To explicate, B.S. Yadav9 was a case in which the

judicial officers promoted to the higher judicial service of

Punjab and Haryana, two different States with a unified

High Court, challenged the determination of seniority

inter se promotees and direct recruits based on two

different sets of rules. A Constitution bench of this Court

held that although the State Legislature or the Governor

has the authority to pass laws regulating the

recruitment of Judicial Officers of the State under Article

309, the extent of these powers is to be regulated by

Article 235, ensuring that the Rules and Regulations

made do not impinge upon or detrimentally affect the

control vested in the High Court by Article 235.

34. Similarly, in Bal Mukund Sah10, this Court

considered the application of reservation of vacancies, as

enacted by the State of Bihar in the direct recruitment

to the posts in the judiciary of the State, both to the

Page 19 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Higher Judicial Services of District Judges and the

grassroots level in the lower rungs of the judiciary. The

Constitution Bench therein held that the appropriate

Legislature or the Governor can regulate the recruitment

and conditions of services of the persons appointed to

public services and posts, only subject to other

provisions of the Constitution, including the power of

superintendence conferred on the High Court under

Article 235.

35. It is therefore quite clear that both the Constitution

Bench decisions definitively state that, whether it

concerns recruitment or the determination of seniority,

the State Legislature empowered under Article 309 or

the Governor, exercising the power to make rules under

the proviso to Article 309, ought to consult the High

Court. This is especially so when Article 309 is subject

to other provisions of the Constitution, giving primacy to

Articles 233 to 235, wherein the control of the entire

District Judiciary is conceded to the High Court.

Page 20 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

36. Having said that, we consider it necessary to

observe that there can be no doubt that this Court faces

no constitutional impediment in exercising its unique

power of judicial review under Article 32, read with other

relevant provisions of the Constitution, including

Articles 141 and 142, to lay down uniform guidelines

governing the structure and functioning of the judicial

services across the country. It is imperative to note that

this very function has been carried out by this Court

through a series of judgments passed in the instant Writ

Petition as well as in other cases, including in Rejanish

K.V.1 and Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U.P. Public

Service Commission11, with the consistent goal of

strengthening the judiciary by fostering uniformity in the

structure of judicial services, enabling judicial

institutions to be more effective, and ensuring that

excellence and merit continue to remain the hallmark of

judicial officers.

Page 21 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

37. There is no gainsaying that Articles 233 to 235

assign policy decisions, such as the specific manner of

implementing the directions of this Court, to the domain

of the High Court. However, at the same time, it is also

essential that overarching guidelines, which would apply

across all States, be framed to ensure the development

of unified and robust judicial services, with the ultimate

goal of cultivating an independent judiciary. These

guidelines do not foreclose the powers of the High Court;

instead, they establish a homogenous framework within

which each High Court, as a Constitutional Court, can

exercise superintendence over the judicial services.

II. The curious case of ‘Heartburn’

38. Having addressed the initial concern about this

Court's propriety to enter into the domain of seniority

within the judicial services, we turn our attention to the

issue of ‘heartburn’.

39. The RPs in this regard vehemently urged that a

separate quota be created in their favour within the HJS

Page 22 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 for career advancement. They pointed out their service

in the judicial service in the Senior Division and the

Junior Division, which, according to them, has been

recognised by this Court in Rejanish K.V.1 as being far

superior to experience at the Bar. They further

contended that the ‘heartburn’ caused by the induction

of younger candidates as DRs and their consequential

career progression diminishes the efforts of officers who

have toiled endlessly in their judicial work.

40. It may be noticed that the Constitution Bench in

Rejanish K.V.1, while permitting judicial officers to

compete along with the Members of the Bar for direct

recruitment to HJS, did not observe that the experience

in judicial service is superior to that of a practising

advocate, but only noticed that it is in no manner

inferior.

41. It merits emphasis that in prescribing the

minimum years of practice for recruitment to the lower

rungs of the judiciary, this Court on earlier occasions

Page 23 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 specifically laid stress upon the experience at the Bar as

an essential requirement for entry into judicial service.

The three-judge Bench in the Sixth AIJA8 merely

equated judicial service and experience at the Bar and

did not confer any supremacy on one as against the

other.

42. In this context, it must be noted that the

discontentment of the RPs within the HJS cadre has

been mitigated to a large extent by increasing the ratio

for the HJS cadre for LDCEs, and by enabling judicial

officers who have completed a minimum period of service

and reached an age, at par with that prescribed for bar

members are also being considered for direct

recruitment to the HJS.

43. We also need to note that the DRs, especially the

members from the Bar, are now at a disadvantage due

to the decision in R. Poornima v. Union of India12. This

dictum provides that consideration for recommendation

to the High Court will be possible only after they have

Page 24 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 completed ten years as a judicial officer. In sharp

contrast, an RP or LDCE would face an advantage in this

scenario since such a requirement would also take into

consideration their service at the lower rungs of the

judiciary and the HJS.

44. The data supplied by various High Courts, hence,

has to be looked at in the above perspective. The last

three decades have witnessed substantial changes in the

minimum required experience for recruitment to the

lower rungs in the judiciary. In 1993, three years’

experience at the Bar was prescribed by this Court.

Although this minimum requirement was dispensed

with in the year 2002, this position has occupied the

field for the last two decades.

45. Presently, State Judiciaries are in the cusp of a

major change with the reintroduction of the minimum

three years’ experience at the Bar for recruitment to

junior division and the further directions issued by this

Court in Sixth AIJA8 enabling accelerated career

Page 25 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 progression to the judicial officers recruited and

continuing in the lower rungs of judiciary, with an

additional provision for participating in direct

recruitment to HJS, as provided in Rejanish K.V1. The

data supplied concerns persons continuing in the State

Judiciary, which also varies from State to State.

46. As has been noticed earlier, some of the States have

more RPs occupying positions of significance, while in

others the DRs are more prominent. High Courts across

the country are also not ad idem on the issue raised,

with most of them exhorting before this Court to neither

enter into the question of a further seniority

determination in the HJS, different from that assigned

on entry thereat, nor to tweak the assignment of

seniority based on roster points applied to the ratio of

recruitment from the three sources.

47. Even within the HJS, the fixation in the Selection

Grade and the Super Time Scale is regulated by merit-

cum-seniority; seniority being assigned from the date of

Page 26 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 entry into the HJS in proportion with the ratio based on

the roster points assigned to each source. As in any

selection based on merit-cum-seniority, merit remains

the dominant consideration, and seniority is applied

only when the merit or suitability stands equal. The

consideration of merit is performance-based within the

cadre of HJS, relatable to various periods spent in that

cadre and not those spent earlier in the lower rungs of

the judiciary.

48. This is also the position with respect to the

assignment of administrative duties in a District, which

falls upon the senior-most within the HJS, in a given

District, designated as District Judge or Principal

District Judge.

49. The fixation in higher grades and designations for

the purpose of discharging administrative duties is never

dependent solely on seniority; merit and suitability are

the norm, which must be evaluated based on service in

that cadre, rather than prior service in the lower rungs.

Page 27 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

50. In bringing this issue to a close, we consider it

appropriate to employ an analogy to illustrate the

relative modes of entry into the Higher Judicial Service.

If entry into the HJS is viewed as a common destination,

one may conceive of DRs as reaching that destination by

flight, LDCEs as travelling by train, and RPs as

traversing the distance on foot. At first blush, it may

indeed appear that the RPs experience a greater degree

of heartburn when compared to the relative swiftness

with which the other categories are able to enter the

HJS.

51. However, this perceived difficulty stands

sufficiently addressed by the fact that this Court has

ensured the availability of multiple avenues to

Promotees for career advancement—whether through

the LDCE, or, as recognised in Rejanish K.V.1, through

the option of participating in the Direct Recruitment

process.

Page 28 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

52. When such opportunities exist, the mere inability

of certain officers to succeed in these examinations on

the basis of merit, or the contention that their

promotional channel is slower or numerically larger,

cannot furnish a valid basis for seeking preferential

treatment within the HJS merely on account of a sense

of grievance. It is well settled that career progression to

the higher echelons of the judiciary is neither a matter

of right nor of entitlement.

III. Non-retention of ‘Birthmark’

53. The issue of determining seniority, inter se RPs and

DRs has vexed public offices from the very inception, and

there is a wealth of precedents to rely upon.

54. For instance, in Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of

Customs13, this court considered the rotational system

for granting seniority between DRs and RPs upon

entering a cadre, as well as maintaining that seniority

upon promotion to higher posts. In the context of

promotion from the post of Appraisers to the Principal

Page 29 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Appraisers, the Constitution Bench ruled that when

there is only one recruitment source, the normal rule

applies, i.e. a person promoted to a higher grade gains

seniority in that grade based on the date of promotion,

provided they are found fit and confirmed in the higher

grade after the probation period. In such cases,

continuous appointment in the higher grade determines

seniority, since the source of recruitment is the same.

55. This principle straightforwardly applies to the

fixation of seniority in the Selection Grade and Super

Time Scale within the HJS in the cadre of District

Judges, recruited or promoted from the three different

sources. Further career advancement in the HJS thus

depends on seniority within that cadre, not the feeder

category.

56. This principle was followed by another Constitution

Bench in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India14,

which was concerned with the promotion from Train

Page 30 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Examiners ‘D’ Grade, which was a common cadre formed

by separate sources, to Train Examiners ‘C’ Grade.

57. The decision in State of Jammu & Kashmir v.

Sh. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.15 also stands out in

this context, where a Constitution Bench of this Court

had the opportunity to expand the principle laid out in

Mervyn Coutindo13 and Roshan Lal Tandon14.

Judicial scrutiny in that case was limited to considering

whether a classification based on educational

qualification had a reasonable basis and bore a nexus

with the object in view. When approving the

classification, the Court noted that the rules did not

discriminate among graduates on the basis of source,

thereby undermining any claim of a ‘birthmark’ in the

cadre influencing the classification.

58. Article 16, ensuring equality of opportunities in

matters relating to employment, was held to be an

instance of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article

14. The concept of equality, it was held, has an inherent

Page 31 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 limitation arising from the very nature of the

constitutional guarantee, mandating ‘equality for equals’

and not for ‘unequals’. The classification on the basis of

educational qualification, made with a view to achieving

administrative efficiency, was held to be not resting on

any fortuitous circumstances and, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, justified the validity of such

classification.

59. The ratio in Roshan Lal Tandon14 insofar as it

held that the direct recruits and promotees lost their

birthmarks on fusion into a common stream of service,

prohibiting their classification on the basis of the source

from which they were recruited, was found to be not

applicable in the facts and circumstances of Triloki

Nath Khosa15. The Constitution Bench in Triloki Nath

Khosa15 held that “… The ratio of Roshan Lal’s case can

at best be an impediment in favouring persons drawn

from one source as against those drawn from another for

the reason merely that they are drawn from different

Page 32 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 sources” (sic para 47). This impediment is in the teeth of

the answer to the question posed by the Amicus in this

case.

60. The dictum of Roshan Lal Tandon14 as succinctly

stated in Triloki Nath Khosa15 however, squarely

applies in the case of District Judges appointed from

three different sources, being further classified on the

basis of their length of service in the lower rungs of the

judiciary, prejudicing the DRs, who do not have the

advantage of such service in the lower cadre.

61. In this light, the theory of classification, as

proposed by the Amicus, subverts and submerges the

precious guarantee of equality as available to the

members of the common cadre, who, on appointment

and determination of their inter se seniority, at the time

of appointment into the HJS, lose the ‘birthmark’ of the

source from which they are appointed.

62. Reference must also be made in this regard to the

decision in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering

Page 33 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra and

Ors.16, which was inter alia concerned with the inter se

seniority of direct recruits and promotees, as also the

determination of seniority of ad-hoc appointees. While

deciding the issues, including that of implementation of

a quota and the consequence of its breakdown, it was

unequivocally held that, on appointment to a post in

accordance with the rules, seniority ought to be

conferred from the date of initial appointment; the

departure being possible only when the initial

appointment is ad-hoc and not in accordance with the

rules, with which issues we are not concerned.

63. The appointment made by way of a stopgap

arrangement without considering the claims of the

eligible available persons and without following the rules

of appointment was held to be not comparable with the

experience of a regular appointee, because of the sheer

qualitative difference in the appointment itself. It was

reiterated that otherwise there would be treatment of

Page 34 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 unequals as equals, which would violate the principle of

equality spelt out in Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution. These principles were further reiterated in

the cases of State of West Bengal v. Aghore Nath

Dey17 and Ram Janam Singh v. State of Uttar

Pradesh18.

64. Hence, if at all the experience in the lower rungs of

the judiciary is to be reckoned for determining seniority

in HJS, there should be some compelling reason which

stands the test of reasonableness, not being vitiated by

the foul of arbitrariness, which again has to be provided

by means of statutory rules. In our view, there is no

basis to consider the previous experience as a Civil

Judge as an intelligible differentia creating a reasonable

classification to favour RPs or LDCEs in the selection for

higher grade scales or appointment as Principal District

Judges.

65. However, it goes without saying that this does not

preclude the High Courts, which are capable of deciding

Page 35 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 on compelling reasons based on the particular facts and

circumstances of each State, along with available data

and statistics, from providing preferential treatment to

any group within the HJS. Provided that such

preferential treatment does not go contrary to the

principles enunciated in Triloki Nath Khosa15, and is

incorporated within the statutory rules.

IV. The Roster and its implementation

66. As previously observed, this Court, in the Fourth

AIJA5, had found that preparation of a Roster is the

most suitable method of determining seniority within the

HJS, and we see no reason to deviate therefrom.

However, hindsight, experience, and subsequent

developments have necessitated that this Court take a

fresh look at some aspects of the roster system of

seniority and address the issues and gaps that have

emerged therein.

67. Submissions were made from both sides on the

efficacy of a 40-point roster as stipulated in the Fourth

Page 36 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 AIJA5, where the quota for RP, LDCE, and DR was set in

a 50:25:25 ratio. Although this ratio for the composition

of the cadre was later modified to 65:10:25, the earlier

ratio was reinstated by the Constitution Bench in the

Sixth AIJA8. Whereas, though the stipulation for a 40-

point seniority roster has remained a common feature

across different States, its exact formulations remain

varied.

68. At present, the sequence of seniority and the

specific roster points assigned to each source are

decided by the respective State Governments in

consultation with the High Court and stipulated in the

relevant service rules. Most of the States / Union

Territories / High Courts have supplied this Court with

the details of the roster points prescribed in their

respective rules. A majority of the States have allocated

the first three positions to the RPs, followed by one to

the DRs and one to LDCE, with the roster points

repeated in the said sequence. However, insofar as the

Page 37 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 Northeastern States, Chhattisgarh, and Gujarat, are

concerned, LDCE is given preference in seniority over the

DRs, with the first positions going to the RPs.

69. In three other States, the situation is different, as

the LDCEs have been given the first preference in

seniority, followed by the RPs and then the DRs. Clearly,

the determination of the roster points has created

divergent service rules for the same cadre of officers. In

our considered opinion, this situation is an affront to the

ideal of uniformity within the judicial services that is

sought to be preserved through these proceedings.

70. With these observations and having considered the

suggestions made across the Bar on this matter, it

appears to us that the most appropriate mechanism to

harmonise the system of seniority across the HJS is a 4-

point roster system, wherein the first two points shall be

allocated to RPs, the third to LDCE(s), and the fourth to

DR(s). This roster would, it goes without saying, repeat

Page 38 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 thereafter, till all the appointees are placed within the

roster.

71. In this backdrop, we may also clarify that the roster

is an annual creation. The timeline for recruitment to

HJS, as well as the lower judicial services, is prescribed

in the operative portions of Malik Mazhar Sultan11. If

the judgment is followed by the letter, it would result in

all appointments, from all three sources, being achieved

within the same year. The annual roster is envisaged as

a complementary component to manage the intake from

all three sources and assign inter se seniority thereto. In

this situation, the fixation of seniority among RPs,

LDCEs, and DRs shall be determined according to the

roster points for that particular year, de hors the exact

date of appointment. To put it tersely, as long as the

appointment takes place within the same year as that in

which the recruitment is initiated, there are no qualms

in placing all such appointees within the same roster of

that year.

Page 39 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

72. The above clarification, as an obvious

consequence, then begs the question: what would

happen when the recruitment does not conclude within

the same year as when it was initiated? Experience

indicates that, especially since the process of evaluation

for promotion is based on merit-cum-seniority, with

merit being the predominant factor, delays are likely in

selecting LDCE candidates and even more so in the case

of DRs, where merit is the sole consideration—

complications in the evaluation process, unexpected

administrative holdups, and lengthy litigation are just a

list of examples that delay the procedure.

73. That, however, is only one side of the coin. On the

flip side, this Court must also uphold and enforce the

ideal of seniority as per continuous service within the

cadre to prevent the anomalies that many States are

faced with today. The aforementioned question has

remained one of the significant gaps in the existing

directions regarding the seniority roster in the HJS, and

Page 40 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 this Court must now strike a balance between these two

concerns.

74. This is not the first occasion that this Court has

had to consider the impact of selection delays on a

seniority roster of a government service. Union of India.

v. N.R. Parmar19 considered the inter se seniority

between direct recruits and the promotees. Therein, the

direct recruitment process, though substantially

commenced in the same recruitment year, could not be

completed within that recruitment year, so the

promotees were appointed substantially before the direct

recruits, who finally joined two years later. In such a

situation, this Court permitted the placement of such

direct recruits within the same roster as the timely

appointed promotees, since the delay was attributable to

the rigmaroles of a direct recruitment.

75. In K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro20, a

three-Judge Bench overruled the decision in N.R.

Parmar19 to hold that the general principle of law is that

Page 41 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 a direct recruit cannot get a back-dated notional

seniority, earlier than the date when he joined in service. A Two-Judge Bench in Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan

Singh Rao21 doubted the correctness of K.

Meghachandra Singh20 especially since the attention

of the three Judge Bench was not invited to the decision

of a Co-ordinate Bench in M. Subba Reddy v. A.P.

SRTC22.

76. In Hariharan21, attention was drawn to the

anomaly arising when the process of recruitment of

direct recruits is completed within the same recruitment

year, yet an adequate number of candidates could not

be selected. It was observed that in such circumstances,

the shortfall must be carried forward to the succeeding

recruitment year. Consequently, candidates selected

against such carried-forward vacancies are required to

be placed en bloc below the Promotees of the earlier

years. Unless this procedure is adhered to, the rotation

of the quota system stands frustrated.

Page 42 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

77. The reference was thus only with respect to the

selections made from different sources, based on a ratio

applied to the cadre, to vacancies arising in a

recruitment year.

78. While this particular issue remains pending in the

abovementioned reference, in our view, keeping in mind

the most celebrated principle of assigning seniority on

the basis of the period of continuous service while also

acknowledging the almost inevitable incidence of

speedbumps, the model delineated hereinafter for the

purposes of HJS would be most appropriate.

79. If the recruitment process from any source is not

completed in the year in which it began, but

appointments are made before the end of the following

year, those appointees shall be placed at their respective

roster points for the year of initiation. Provided that no

appointments from any source are made for the next

recruitment year before these appointments are effected.

Page 43 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

80. To illustrate, let us consider that the recruitment

process from all three sources is initiated in Year A. The

procedures for appointment of LDCEs and RPs are

completed within the same Year A, and they are placed

in the Annual Roster for Year A. However, a variety of

issues cause the appointments of DRs to happen only in

Year A+1. Now, these DRs, although appointed in Year

A+1, would be permitted to also take their positions

within the roster for Year A, as long as they were

appointed prior to the LDCEs, RPs, and DRs whose

recruitment is initiated in Year A+1.

81. Barring the above exception, we affirm that the

continuous length of service ought to be the criterion for

determining inter se seniority in the HJS, subject to the

further condition that all appointees in a single

recruitment year are placed against their respective

annual roster points, regardless of the actual date of

appointment.

Page 44 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

82. The above mechanism, in our opinion, serves to

mitigate the grievances and preserve the seniority of an

appointee who was subsequently borne in service only

due to the vagaries of the recruitment process. In the

same vein, the officers appointed earlier also cannot be

aggrieved, as they would be adjusted within the roster

only along with their relative contemporaries in the

service and would be put on notice regarding the

seniority determination once the other selections are

concluded.

83. If the High Court, for any valid reason, decides not

to initiate the recruitment process from any of the three

sources in a given year, the person subsequently

appointed from those sources shall not be eligible to be

placed within the roster for that year in which

recruitment from the source did not take place.

84. We are at the same time also cognizant of the

necessity of ensuring that vacancies in the judicial

services do not remain unfilled, the negative

Page 45 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 consequences of which have been very cogently

addressed by this Court in Mazhar Malik Sultan11. To

this end, this Court in the Sixth AIJA8, has already

provided that unfilled vacancies within the LDCE quota

may be diverted and filled by RPs.

85. In our considered opinion, the above system can

also be extended to the vacancies that remain unfilled

after the process of direct recruitment is completed. To

explicate, when some of the vacancies pertaining to DRs

or LDCEs in a particular year are not filled up due to

non-availability of suitable candidates from these

sources, despite the recruitment process being taken to

its conclusion, the positions which remain vacant for

want of candidates shall be filled up in the same

recruitment year through regular promotion from the

cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) as per the

applicable rules.

86. In such a scenario, the candidates who are

ordinarily selected from the three sources are assigned

Page 46 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 seniority on induction to the HJS as per the Annual

Roster in the regular manner. The remaining RPs, who

are promoted in the vacancies from the other sources,

would also be entitled to be placed in the same roster,

but they would only occupy the subsequent positions for

RPs, i.e., this diversion does not grant the roster position

of LDCEs or DRs to these RPs. In the subsequent

recruitment year, the ratio of 50:25:25 should guide the

computation of vacancies to be filled from each source.

This would be a continuing exercise of applying the

roster points on the candidates selected in each

recruitment year, while the ratio is applied to the cadre,

for determining the vacancies arising in a subsequent

year.

V. Data – an unreliable guide

87. Despite the data presented by the Amicus Curiae as

to the constitution of the HJS in various States,

specifically the number of posts occupied by the RPs and

the DRs, a reality check on facts is not possible due to

Page 47 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 the rather amorphous and fluid situation that has

existed in the past three decades.

88. As was found, it was in 1992 that this Court in the

Second AIJA3 prescribed a minimum requirement of

three years’ practice at the Bar for recruitment to the

lower rungs of the judiciary. Before that, it was not

uniform and different periods were prescribed in

different States; as we saw from Kerala, which

prescribed a minimum five years’ practice at the Bar for

recruitment to the entry point at the lower rung of the

judiciary, which stood approved in 1994 by the Third

AIJA4.

89. Be it the three-year course or the five-year course

in LL.B, the latter of which commenced only in 1988-89,

that too initially confined to National Law Universities,

the average age of recruitment as Munsiff/Magistrate

would have been 26 to 28. The age limit would further

increase in the case of reservations, wherever it was

enabled with a relaxation in the maximum age. There

Page 48 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 would be minimal representation of those who were

recruited at the commencement of the three decades just

past.

90. With the Fourth AIJA5, in 2002, the requirement

of practice was fully dispensed with, in which context,

the age of recruitment could be anything above 23 years;

who would be the present incumbents in the post of

District Judges, having been promoted from the Senior

Division. Even then, the time spent in Junior Division

and Senior Division, before promotion to the HJS varied

considerably in the different States and there could be

no common malady ferreted out which requires

mitigation.

91. We are constrained to observe that the suggestions

as placed on record by the learned Amicus would be

counter-productive and would run against established

norms of service jurisprudence, if the service in the lower

cadre is reckoned for determining the seniority in the

higher cadre, especially when, in addition to regular

Page 49 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 promotions, there is a merit based promotion

opportunity through LDCE and DR, participation in

which is now permitted to both the existing Judicial

Officers and the Members of the Bar.

92. The ratio of 1:1, as suggested by the Amicus and

the zone of consideration of 50% officers from the two

categories of promotion and direct recruitment, would

only create further disparities and lead to

discontentment of those promoted on merit and would

create a disadvantage to those Judicial Officers who are

directly recruited to the HJS. A three-year seniority

would also cause injustice insofar as direct recruitment

is concerned, providing no such incentive to a Judicial

Officer who had earlier been in the Junior Division or the

Senior Division.

93. The separate seniority list in respect of the three

different sources would also result in inequalities. We

have no reason to doubt that creating quotas for fixation

in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within the

Page 50 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 cadre of District Judges based on the prior service in the

lower rungs of the Judiciary would be iniquitous and

would result in sacrificing merit.

94. As was observed, the disparities in the data and

statistics presented, coupled with the anticipated

change in the constitution of the HJS prompted by the

Sixth AIJA8 and Rejanish K.V1 make today a wholly

inopportune moment to bring in any weightage to RPs in

the HJS, on the basis of their service in the Junior

Division and the Senior Division. This is, especially so,

when the merit, suitability and seniority determined for

fixation in the higher grades of Selection Grade and

Super Time Scale have to be factored and evaluated on

the basis of the service in the HJS and not that in the

lower feeder cadre. The earlier service in the lower rungs

of the judiciary can only enable a meritorious promotion

to the HJS, and the incumbents in the HJS having lost

their ‘genetic blemish’ or so to say the ‘genetic

adornment’ of experience in the lower cadre, will have to

Page 51 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 prove their merit in the HJS for further career

advancement. It would also dampen the spirit of those

who avail the chances of accelerated promotion, since

then, there would be no incentive in taking that

opportunity.

95. Ambition is a ladder, the last rung of which is

always elusive to the one pursuing it, who endlessly

searches for it; based on which, seniority cannot be

fixed. For all these reasons, we are compelled to note

that the questions raised and the reliefs sought by the

learned Amicus through this Interlocutory Application

must be declined, save for the mechanisms envisaged

and enumerated through this judgment.

96. Perhaps at this juncture and milieu, prior to

solidifying our conclusions and directions, it would be

fitting to quote a passage from the First AIJA2:

“Judges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to avoid; make decisions.”

Page 52 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS

97. Before proceeding any further, we consider it

apposite to record a caveat that the guidelines issued

herein are not intended to adjudicate or resolve any inter

se seniority dispute among RPs, LDCEs and DRs. What

we seek to lay down are general and mandatory

guidelines which shall, henceforth, be incorporated into

the respective statutory service rules governing the

determination of inter se seniority among officers

appointed from different sources to the Higher Judicial

Services.

98. Likewise, the directions issued herein shall not be

construed as an avenue to reopen or unsettle inter se

seniorities that have already been determined between

officers appointed from the different sources of

recruitment.

99. It is further clarified that such directions, as well

as this judgment in toto, are being issued considering the

issues as on date and may require reconsideration upon

Page 53 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 observing the ultimate impact and effect of the decisions

rendered by the Constitution Bench in Rejanish K.V.1

and the Sixth AIJA8. We say so, being mindful of the

fact that the inter se position amongst RPs, LDCEs and

DRs is likely to undergo substantial change in due

course, in light of the aforesaid decisions. Such altered

circumstances may necessitate a review, modification,

or recall of the present directions.

100. In this vein, we deem it appropriate to invoke our

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to record

the following conclusions and issue the ensuing

directions:

(i) That, perceived discontentment and heartburn without something more in the form of a legal claim, illegal denial, or at least a legitimate expectation cannot result in creating an artificial classification of members within a cadre.

(ii) That, the statistical data is disparate and does not provide a substantial basis to find such discontentment and heartburn of RPs in the HJS, to be justified.

(iii) That, there is no common malady of disproportionate representation of DRs in the HJS such that it is diminishing the

Page 54 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 prospects of financial upgradation or designation as Principal District Judges to the promotees, which afflict the Country as a whole or make it imperative for this Court to resolve it, by giving a preference to RPs or LDCEs.

(iv) That, the data put forth in many States indicates a prevalence or equivalence of RPs in the HJS and key positions, which is natural since their ratio is 3/4th of the total posts in the cadre.

(v) That, on the entry into a common cadre from different sources (RP, LDCE and DR) and assignment of seniority as per the annual roster, the incumbents lose their ‘birthmark’ of the source from which they are recruited.

(vi) That fixation in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale within the HJS is based on the merit-cum-seniority within the cadre and cannot depend upon the length of service or performance in the lower rungs of the Judiciary; the latter loses its significance after RPs and LDCEs, by its virtue, are propelled into the HJS.

Reliance on it does not serve the object of efficient administration of justice and is counterproductive.

(vii) That, the length and performance as a Civil Judge also does not constitute an intelligible differentia to classify incumbents in the common cadre of District Judge and the classification made in Triloki Nath Khosa15 by a Constitution Bench of this Court on the basis of educational qualifications stands on a different footing.

Page 55 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

(viii) That, individual career aspirations are a normal incidence of service, accentuated only by better performance; they are not connected to the objective of an independent and strengthened judiciary and cannot guide the shape of the rules of seniority.

(ix) That, sufficient accelerated opportunities are provided for Members of the Judicial Service entering into the lower rungs, for career advancement as provided by the Constitution Bench in Rejanish K.V.1; enabling the reckoning of their service for direct recruitment to HJS and by the Sixth AIJA8; facilitating fast-track promotions to Civil Judge (Senior Division) and the HJS through reduction in the minimum period of service.

(x) That, the seniority of officers within the HJS shall be determined through an annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers appointed in the particular year in the repeating sequence of 2 RPs, 1 LDCE, and 1 DR.

(xi) That, only if the recruitment process is completed within the year after which it was initiated and no other appointments, from any of the three sources, have already taken place in respect of the recruitment initiated for that subsequent year, shall the officers belatedly so appointed be entitled to seniority as per the roster of the year in which recruitment was initiated.

(xii) That, if the recruitment process is not initiated for vacancies arising in a given year in the same year, the candidate filling such vacancy, in subsequent recruitment, shall be granted seniority

Page 56 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 within the annual roster of the year in which the recruitment process is finally concluded and appointment is made.

(xiii) That, after the recruitment of DRs and LDCEs is complete for a particular year, the positions falling in their quota that remain unfilled due to lack of suitable candidates shall be filled through RPs, subject to such RPs being placed only on subsequent RP positions in the annual roster; and the vacancies in the subsequent year shall be computed so as to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the entire cadre.

(xiv) That, the statutory rules governing the HJS in the respective States, in consultation with the High Courts, shall prescribe the exact modalities of the Annual Roster and how the directions of this judgement shall be implemented.

101. The respective States / Union Territory

Administrations are hereby also directed to undertake

appropriate amendments in their respective statutory

rules, in consultation with the High Court, to bring them

in consonance with the guidelines laid down in this

judgment, within a period of three months.

102. The question framed by us is thus answered in the

above terms. The instant Interlocutory Application

stands disposed of.

Page 57 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

103. I.A. Nos. 269261 and 270515/2025 also stand

disposed of.

104. Ordered accordingly.

.…….......……………….CJI (B.R. GAVAI)

….…….......……………….J. (SURYA KANT)

….…….......……………….J. (VIKRAM NATH)

….…….......……………….J. (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

….…….......……………….J. (JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

New Delhi;

November 19, 2025

Page 58 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989 1 Rejanish K.V. v K. Deepa 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2196

2 First AIJA 2 (1992) 1 SCC 119

3 Second AIJA 3 (1993) 4 SCC 288

4 Third AIJA 4 (1994) SCC 314

5 Fourth AIJA 5 (2002) 4 SCC 247

6 R.K. Sabharwal & Ors. v. State of 6 (1995) 2 SCC 745

Punjab & Ors.

7 Fifth AIJA 7 (2010) 15 SCC 170

8 Sixth AIJA 8 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184

9 B.S. Yadav v. State of Haryana 9 (1980) Supp SCC 524

10 State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah 10 (2000) 4 SCC 640

11 Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U.P. Public 11 (2008) 17 SCC 703

Service Commission 12 R. Poornima v. Union of India 12 (2023) 12 SCC 519

13 Mervyn Coutindo v. Collector of 13 (1966) 3 SCR 600

Customs 14 Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India 14 (1968) 1 SCR 185

15 State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sh. 15 (1974) 1 SCC 19

Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.

16 Direct Recruit Class II Engineering 16 (1990) 2 SCC 715

Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

17 State of West Bengal v. Aghore Nath 17 (1993) 3 SCC 371

Dey 18 Ram Janam Singh v. State of Uttar 18 (1994) 2 SCC 622

Pradesh 19 Union of India. v. N.R. Parmar 19 (2012) 13 SCC 340

20 K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam 20 (2020) 5 SCC 689

Siro 21 Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan Singh 21 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1717

Rao 22 M. Subba Reddy v. A.P. SRTC 22 (2004) 6 SCC 729

Page 59 of 59 I.A. Nos. 230675 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989