Alamelu & Anr vs State Rep.By Inspector Of Police

2 In Criminal Appeal No.1062 of 2009, both the appellants were convicted under Sections 366 and 376 read with Section 109 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs.500/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.

2. Briefly stated the prosecution story is that PW2

(hereinafter referred to as the "victim" or "girl" according

to context) is the daughter of Chinnathambi, (PW1) who

is a teacher and resident of Nedupatti Village, Namakkal

District, Tamil Nadu. The victim had failed in the SSLC

examination. Therefore, she was admitted in private

tutorial college called Seran Tutorial College.

3. It is alleged that on 31st July, 1993 at about 3.00 p.m.

when she was walking near Nedupatti on the way to her

house from the local bus stop, after attending her tutorial

classes, Sekar (A1) told her that he loved her and wanted to

marry her. The victim, however, did not agree to such

proposal. Thereafter, a car bearing registration No. TTA 1886

came near the victim and she was forcibly pushed into the car

by Sekar (A1). Rangaswami (A2), Paramasivam (A4) and

Alamelu (A5) were already inside the car. This incident was 3 informed to the father (PW1) of the victim by one Sugavanam,

who had received a call from Sekar (A1). The incident was

confirmed by another person called Thangavel (PW3) who

informed PW1 about an hour later.

4. Since PW1 is a handicapped person and unable to walk, he

sent his relatives in search of his daughter. According to

the prosecution case, the car was taken to the residence of

Selvi, who is the sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti.

Thereafter, Parmasivam (A4), Alamelu (A5) and Subramani

(A8) were advising the victim to marry Sekar (A1), however,

she refused to do so. At that stage, Kandasamy (A7)

declared that it is not necessary to take the consent of PW2

and they should just go to the temple in the morning and

perform the marriage ceremony.

5. The next morning, on 1st August, 1993 at 4 `o' clock, they

all took the victim to Arapaleeswarar Temple at Kolli Hills.

On reaching the temple, Sekar (A1) tied the mangalsutra

on the neck of the victim in spite of her resistance.

Thereafter, she was taken to Mullukurichi. She was kept in

a house and repeatedly raped for three days.

4

6. On 4th August, 1993, she was taken by Sekar (A1) to

Palampatti. Since it was known to Sekar (A1) that the

police was searching for the girl (PW2), he took her to

Thiruverumbur Police Station. He told the police officials

there that they were husband and wife and had been

legally married.

7. In the meantime on 3rd August, 1993, PW-10, the Sub-

Inspector of Police of Vennandur Police Station on the

basis of the complaint dated 2nd August, 1993 went to the

place of occurrence and prepared observations mahazar

(Ex.P8) and rough sketch (Ex.P7) and recorded the

statements of the witnesses.

8. On receipt of a copy of the FIR on 6th August, 1993, the

Circle Inspector of Rasipuram Circle (PW11) took over the

investigation. On the basis of the information gathered,

PW11 arrested Sekar (A1) and rescued the girl (PW2) from

door No.86, Thiruverumbur Police colony on 10th August,

1993. In the presence of the witnesses PW11 recovered

mangalasutra, the dresses worn by the accused (A1) and

the victim under mahazars. He arranged to send the seized

properties for chemical analysis. In the morning of 11th

5 August, 1993, Sekar (A1) and Thangamani were sent to

the local Magistrate's Court. Thereafter, he (A1) was

remanded to judicial custody.

9. At the same time, the victim was sent for a medical

examination. PW13 Dr. Manimegalaikumar examined the

victim on 12th August, 1993 at 2.00 p.m. and recorded her

findings in report Ex.P13. In the report, she opined that

age of the victim was between 17 to 19 years. On the other

hand, PW8, Dr. Gunasekaran, the Radiologist had given

her age as above 17 years and below 18 years. Dr.

Chidambaram (PW14) examined A1 on 11th August, 1993

at 8.00 p.m. In his report (Ex.P15) he stated about the

potency of A1.

10. Thereafter, PW12, the successor of PW11, after seizing the

vehicle used for abduction and after completing the

investigation filed the charge sheet on 19th June, 1996

(Ex.P13) against Sekar (A1) for offences punishable under

Sections 366 and 376 IPC and accused Nos. 2 to 8 for

offences punishable under Sections 366 and 376 read with

Section 109 IPC.

6

11. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined

PWs.1 to 14. Ex. P1 to P16 have been marked besides

M.O.1 to 11. No one was examined on behalf of the

accused and no documents were produced on their behalf.

12. When the accused were questioned with regard to

incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the

evidence of witnesses, the accused had denied the same as

false. Sekar (A1) filed a written statement which reads as

follows :-

"I am innocent. The charge that I have kidnapped PW2 and married her and raped her is false. On my enquiry I came to know that PW1 and his wife parents of PW2 compelled her to marry her uncle's son. But PW2 refused and she had left the house voluntarily. To suppress the mistake committed by PW2, at the instance of my enemies after several days a false case has been filed against me. The evidence that PW11 arrested me along with PW2 at Thiruverumbur Police colony is false. I was staying in my village and they took me from my house and foisted the case. PW3 is the sister's son of PW2 and, therefore, he is deposing falsely. PW4 is the co-brother of PW1 and therefore, he is giving evidence in support of PW1. PW6 is the close relative of PW2 and therefore, is giving false evidence."

13.On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence,

the trial court convicted and sentenced the accused as

7 noticed in the opening paragraph of the judgment. The

conviction as well as the sentence have been maintained in

appeals. Hence the present appeals.

14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

15. The learned counsel has submitted that the conclusions

reached by both the Courts are perverse. According to him

the inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of

the witnesses which have been ignored by both the courts

would destroy the very root and foundation of the

prosecution case. The High Court has even failed to take

note of the plea raised by the appellant (A1) in the

statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure

Code. Learned counsel submitted that this is a clear case

of false implication. The prosecution is based on an

imaginary story. The witnesses of the prosecution are

procured. They are all close relatives of PW1. He submits

that non appreciation of the evidence by the Courts below

has resulted in miscarriage of justice.

16. Elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel then

submitted that the complaint was falsely lodged by the

8 father (PW1) of the girl (PW2) due to old enmity against A1.

PW2 had only given evidence under pressure from her

father and her relatives. Learned counsel submitted that

the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the true story

which would clearly show that there was no incidence of

abduction. The girl had run away from home as she was

being compelled to marry one of her relatives. The entire

abduction story is due to enmity because of a dispute over

land. According to the learned counsel, the prosecution

has deliberately suppressed the material particulars which

were duly narrated by the prosecution witnesses

themselves. There was no question of any forced marriage

between the victim and Sekar (A1) Learned counsel has

pointed out that at the time of the alleged marriage,

according to the victim (PW2) and Thangavel (PW3), the

relatives of the victim were present. In their presence, there

could be no forced marriage. He further submitted that

had it been a case of abduction PW1, the father of the

victim, would not have waited for two days to lodge a

complaint. Referring to the evidence of PW1, it is pointed

out that he had stated that there was a panchayat held in

the house of the local MLA Palaniammal. It was on the

9 direction of the Panchayat that the victim had decided to

go with her father. Since then she has been with her

parents.

17. The learned counsel has further pointed out that if Sekar

(A1) had taken the victim to the police station, she would

have complained. According to the learned counsel, the

truth of the matter is, which has been admitted by PW1 in

his evidence, that the mother of the girl did not want her

daughter to get married to her maternal uncle's son. The

entire story has been concocted subsequent to the time

when the panchayat was held in the house of the local

MLA. At that time, the police was present but PW1 did not

demand that any one of the accused be arrested. Learned

counsel submitted that a close scrutiny of evidence of the

prosecution witnesses would show that deliberate efforts

have been made to suppress the true version. In any event,

there is no question of any abduction, forcible marriage or

rape.

18. The learned counsel for the State submitted that the

prosecution version is consistent. The trial court as well as

the High Court, upon a thorough scrutiny of the evidence,

10 have given concurrent conclusions about the abduction as

well as rape. Learned counsel further submitted that

according to the father (PW1), the girl (PW2) was only 15

years and 2 months old on 31st July, 1993. Therefore, all

the accused have rightly been found to be guilty of the

offences under Sections 366 and 376 read with Section

109 IPC. He submits that in exercise of the powers under

Article 136, this Court would normally not interfere with

the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. He,

therefore, prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned

counsel for the parties. Before we embark upon an

examination of the evidence, we may point out that even

though the powers of this Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution are very wide, but in criminal appeals, this

Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of

facts, save in very exceptional cases. In an appeal under

Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court does not

normally appreciate the evidence by itself and go into the

question of credibility of witnesses. The assessment of the

evidence by the High Court is accepted as final except

where the conclusions recorded by the High Court are

11 manifestly perverse and unsupportable by the evidence on

record. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we have

examined the findings recorded by the Courts below.

20. In our opinion, there is much substance in the

submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. The

trial court as well as the High Court have failed to take into

consideration the inherent improbabilities in the case

sought to be projected by the prosecution. In our opinion,

the findings recorded by both the Courts below are

perverse and unsupportable by the evidence on record.

21. In our opinion, the prosecution version has been distorted

from beginning to the end, in an effort to suppress the

actual truth. It was the case of the prosecution that

Sugavanam had seen the victim being abducted

on 31st July, 1993. This fact was brought to the notice of

the father (PW1) of the victim (PW2) immediately.

Sugavanam had been told about the abduction on the

phone by Sekar (A1) himself. The abduction was further

confirmed by Thangavel (PW3) about an hour later.

According to PW1, he had sent his relatives, namely,

Kuppusami, Athiappan, Velumani and Thangavel (PW3) in

12 search of his daughter. But he did not go with them.

According to this witness, these persons told him that his

daughter could not be located. Therefore, on 2nd August,

1993 he lodged a complaint with the police.

22. The subsequent events make the story of abduction wholly

improbable. Sugavanam, who had informed the father of

the abduction, was not examined in the Court. It would be

rather odd that Sekar would himself inform Sugavanam of

the abduction, if he was responsible for the same.

Further, PW1 admits that Sekar was not on visiting terms

with the family of the girl. There is no previous history of

any relationship between Sekar and the girl. Even the

High Court concluded that there was no familiarity

between the two. There was no material placed on the

record to show that Sekar was involved with the girl. Even

in this court, no explanation was offered as to why Sekar

would want to marry the victim; in the absence of any

previous familiarity between the two.

23. There is no evidence to prove that the victim was forcibly

taken in a car. Neither the owner nor the driver of the car

has been examined in the Court. PW3 states that they had

13 made enquiries and had been told that the car used in

abduction had gone towards Senthamangalam. They had

also hired a car to go after them. None of these persons

have been examined.

24. Proceeding further, we notice that PW1 admits that all the

relatives mentioned above are very close blood relations. In

fact, Thangavel (PW3) is the son of his elder sister. In other

words, PW3 is a cousin of the girl. Athiappan is the son of

his coparcener Kailasam. Palanivel is the brother-in-law of

Murugesan. Murugesan is the son of Kailasam.

Kuppusamy is the elder brother of Velumani who is the

son of his senior coparcener. Kumaravel is the grand son

of the aunt of Kuppusami. These very close relatives, who

were almost family members, had told PW1 that his

daughter could not be located. But surprisingly, these very

relatives, according to PW2, were present at the temple

just before the marriage. Although, the victim (PW2) knew

that if she was in trouble they would come forward to help

her, she did not raise any alarm. The presence of these

blood relatives is also confirmed by Thangavel (PW3). He

stated that even though these relatives were present at the

marriage, they could not prevent the forced marriage.

14 Knowing fully well that the victim (PW2), was being

compelled to marry Sekar (A1), they did not send someone

to the police station with the necessary complaint.

25. The presence of the relatives at the alleged wedding is

confirmed by Thangavel (PW3). He has stated that they

could not find the girl (PW2) or Sekar (A1) in Rasipuram.

But the search party was told on enquiry that Sekar (A1)

and the girl (PW2) had gone in a car towards

Santhamangalam. Therefore, Thangavel (PW3) and his

relatives also hired a car and reached Arapaleeswar

Temple. But since none of the accused were present, they

decided to stay the night in the temple itself. He further

stated that they had suspected that the marriage will take

place in the morning, therefore, they had waited till the

morning. This witness also stated that he informed his

uncle about the marriage on 2nd August, 1993.

26. PW1 admits that he had been told that his daughter (PW2)

had been abducted by Sekar (A1). The distance between

the house of Sekar (A1) and the house of PW1 was only one

kilometer. He also admits that Sekar (A1) is a local boy but

is not related to him. He had received the information

15 about the alleged abduction on 31st July, 1993. He did not

go to the house of Sekar (A1) to complain to his mother. He

also did not go to the police station. Even the complaint

with the police was registered only at 6.00 p.m. on 2 nd

August, 1993. In his cross-examination, he reiterated that

his relatives had gone to the neighbouring village and

searched but were not able to locate his daughter. From

the evidence of this witness, it becomes quite clear that

there was a dispute between the husband and wife i.e.

mother and father of the victim (PW2) about the proposed

marriage of the girl. Chinnathambi (PW1) states that he

did not want his daughter to get married at all till she

completes higher studies. He wanted her to get married

only after she had become a teacher like himself. On the

other hand, his wife had thought that her daughter (PW2)

should be married to the son of Kuppusami, her maternal

uncle's son. The girl (PW2) did not want to marry her

cousin.

27. Taking the aforesaid evidence into consideration, one

cannot rule out the possibility that the victim girl had run

away from her parental house. This is further apparent

from the statement of PW1 himself. He had stated that

16 soon after the incident a panchayat was held in the house

of Rasipuram MLA, Palaniammal. At that meeting, his wife

and his daughter were also present. But, in his anxiety to

deny that his daughter had agreed to go back home on

asking of MLA, he made a very relevant disclosure. He

stated that "My daughter was asked to talk with myself

and wife separately in a room for one hour. After the lapse

of one hour my daughter told me that she will accompany

me and we also brought her." This statement itself is

indicative of the fact that disappearance of his daughter for

few days may not have been the responsibility of the

accused persons. Otherwise, it would not have taken over

one hour to convince the girl to return home.

28. The testimony of PW1 in fact makes it further clear that

the whole prosecution version has been concocted to

falsely implicate the accused. This witness had admitted

that the police had arrived on 3rd August, 1993. During

that time, Sekar (A1) was also present but no demand was

made for his arrest at all. He also stated that all the

accused were also present, he did not ask for the arrest of

those accused also. No complaint was made to the police at

17 that stage that any of the accused persons were involved in

any incident of abduction. In fact he made another

startling disclosure where he states that "till date I am not

aware as to what happened to Thangamani. On 3rd August,

1993 either myself or any other witness had not furnished

any information against the accused to the police."

According to this witness, the victim, has been with her

family since 3rd August, 1993. He went on to state that

after 3rd August, 1993 the police did not undertake any

further enquiry.

29. Even the testimony given by PW2 also seems to be wholly

unreliable and contrary to the evidence of PW1. According

to her, she was walking towards her house and she was

being followed by Sekar (A1). He had told her that he liked

her and wanted to marry her. She simply told him to go

away and continued to walk towards the house. There was

a car parked near the house of Sekar's mother's elder

sister. She then narrates the story as to how she was

pushed into the car. She stated that she had dropped her

books on the road but, surprisingly though the car was

parked in front of Sekar's aunt's house, no one found the

books.

18

30. She then states that when she was being taken to the

temple, she saw some known persons standing at a

distance. But she did not yell out for help. According to

her, Sekar (A1) had raped her on three consecutive days,

i.e., 1st, 2nd and 3rd of August at Mullukurichi. On 4th of

August she was taken to Palampatti. However, on 5th

August, 1993 when Sekar (A1) received the news that the

police was looking for her, she was taken to Tiruchy police

station. There he had told the police that they were

married. She again did not complain; nor did seek help to

be returned home. Thereafter, on 10th August, 1993

Rasipuram Circle Inspector (PW11) had arrived and

arrested Sekar (A1). It was only after that she was left with

her parents. On the other hand, as noticed earlier, father

states that she has been at home with her parents since 3 rd

August, 1993. This in our opinion leads to an inescapable

conclusion that the versions of the father and the girl are

in sharp contrast, if not contradictory to each other.

31. She had further stated that during the night of

10th August, 1993, she had narrated the entire sequence of

events to the police. The police had also given her

19 alternative clothing to wear and taken her clothes in

possession. According to the victim herself, even after she

was recovered on the 10th August, 1993, she did not go to

the house of her parents, instead she went to the house of

her senior paternal uncle situated at Thengalpalayam.

Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult to place reliance

on any one of the prosecution witnesses.

32. Talking about her alleged forced stay in the house at

Pudupatti, again she was unable to state whether it was

thatched house or terraced house. She was also unable to

state as to whether the door of the room in which she was

kept could be locked only from outside or from inside. In

the same breath, she says that she remained in the room

by locking it from inside. But again she changed her mind

and said that the door was not locked but it was closed.

She talks of one Rangasamy being present. But then she

says that there were two individuals by that name, one old

and one young. But she did not give any of their

particulars to the police, as the police did not ask for them.

Yet she claims that both the Rangasamy had taken her to

the temple. But then she says to the police that only one

Rangasamy took her.

20

33. Now coming to the marriage, she reiterates that some

known persons were present at the temple but on seeing

them she did not raise any alarm. She admits that

Kuppusami, Velumani, Athiappan, Thangavel and

Palaniammal are her close relatives. She also admits that if

she had told them that she was in trouble they would have

helped her. But she did not complain to her relatives. This

would be wholly unnatural behaviour from a girl who had

been abducted and was being compelled to marry

someone, she did not want to marry.

34. The scene after the alleged marriage is equally blurred. The

girl denies ever going to the house of MLA on 3rd August,

1993. She was not aware that any panchayat had been

held in his house on that day. She also states that she did

not go to the house of her father on 3rd August, 1993. She

further denies that she had ever narrated the events that

had occurred between 31st July, 1993 to 10th August, 1993

to her parents.

35. In our opinion, the trial court as well as the High Court

had failed to bestow proper attention on the inherent

improbabilities contained in the evidence of the prime 21 witnesses of the prosecution. Both the courts below had

failed to notice that the prosecution did not even care to

produce any witness from the temple where the marriage

has been allegedly solemnized. No cogent reason has been

given as to why the `Pujari' of the Temple or some other

office bearer could not have been summoned.

36. In our opinion, the entire story about the abduction by car

and the forced marriage seems to have been concocted to

falsely implicate all the accused under Section 366 IPC.

There is no reliable evidence to support the conviction of

Sekar, or the accused relatives of Sekar, for the offence of

abduction under Section 366 IPC. Possibility can not be

ruled out of the father, PW1 suspecting that his daughter

was romantically involved with Sekar. Therefore, when she

disappeared from home, Sekar was presumed to be

responsible for it. Hence the false story of abduction.

Even in the face of the wholly unreliable evidence, as

noticed above, both the Courts have convicted all the

accused under Section 366 and 376 IPC. The High Court,

in our opinion, committed a grave error in confirming the

conviction of the accused/appellants under Section 366

IPC.

22

37. We may now take up the issue of Sekar's conviction under

Section 376 IPC. Whilst upholding the conviction of Sekar

under Section 376 IPC, the High Court has held that the

girl would not have voluntarily gone with Sekar. It has

also been held that she was not a major at the relevant

time. In our opinion, both the conclusions recorded by the

High Court are contrary to the evidence on record.

38. We will first take up the issue with regard to the age of the

girl. The High Court has based its conclusion on the

transfer certificate, Ex.P16 and the certificate issued by

PW8 Dr. Gunasekaran, Radiologist, Ex.P4 and Ex.P5.

Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that

the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore,

even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be

above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on

the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The

transfer certificate has been issued by a Government

School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster.

Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under

Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the

admissibility of such a document would be of not much

23 evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence

of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded.

The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate

would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who

made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

We may notice here that PW1 was examined in the Court

on 9th August, 1999. In his evidence, he made no reference

to the transfer certificate (Ex.P16). He did not mention her

age or date of birth. PW2 was also examined on 9th

August, 1999. She had also made no reference either to

her age or to the transfer certificate. It appears from the

record that a petition was filed by the complainant under

Section 311 Cr.P.C. seeking permission to produce the

transfer certificate and to recall PW2. This petition was

allowed. She was actually recalled and her examination

was continued on 26th April, 2000. The transfer certificate

was marked as Ex.P16 at that stage, i.e., 26th April, 2000.

The judgment was delivered on 28th April, 2000. In her

cross-examination, she had merely stated that she had

signed on the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 issued by the

School and accordingly her date of birth noticed as 15th

June, 1977. She also stated that the certificate has been

24 signed by the father as well as the Headmaster. But the

Headmaster has not been examined. Therefore, in our

opinion, there was no reliable evidence to vouchsafe for the

truth of the facts stated in the transfer certificate.

39. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a

document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad

Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined......................................................... ......................................................................... Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents

1 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 25 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the

case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2,

where this Court observed as follows:-

"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"."

40. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been

discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing

about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The

Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the

entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to

definitely fix the age of the girl.

41. In fixing the age of the girl as below 18 years, the High

Court relied solely on the certificate issued by PW8

Dr. Gunasekaran. However, the High Court failed to notice

that in his evidence before the Court, PW8, the X-ray

Expert had clearly stated in the cross-examination that on

the basis of the medical evidence, generally, the age of an

2 (2003) 8 SCC 745 26 individual could be fixed approximately. He had also

stated that it is likely that the age may vary from

individual to individual. The doctor had also stated that

in view of the possible variations in age, the certificate

mentioned the possible age between one specific age to

another specific age. On the basis of the above, it would

not be possible to give a firm opinion that the girl was

definitely below 18 years of age. In addition, the High

Court failed to consider the expert evidence given by PW13

Dr. Manimegalaikumar, who had medically examined the

victim. In his cross-examination, he had clearly stated

that a medical examination would only point out the age

approximately with a variation of two years. He had stated

that in this case, the age of the girl could be from 17 to 19

years. This margin of error in age has been judicially

recognized by this Court in the case of Jaya Mala Vs.

Home Secretary, Government of Jammu & Kashmir &

Ors.3, In the aforesaid judgment, it is observed as follows:-

"......However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side."

3 (1982) 2 SCC 538 27

42. We are of the opinion, in the facts of this case, the age of

the girl could not have been fixed on the basis of the

transfer certificate. There was no reliable evidence to

vouchsafe the correctness of the date of birth as recorded

in the transfer certificate. The expert evidence does not

rule out the possibility of the girl being a major. In our

opinion, the prosecution has failed to prove that the girl

was a minor, at the relevant date.

43. We may further notice that even with reference to Section

35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be

tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as

criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be

appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court

in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4

held as follows:-

"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a 4 (2006) 5 SCC 584 28 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

44. In such circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the

High Court without examining the factual and legal issues

has unnecessarily rushed to the conclusion that the girl

was a minor at the time of the alleged abduction. There is

no satisfactory evidence to indicate that she was a minor.

45. The High Court concluded that even if one was to exclude

the evidence given by PW3, the conviction for abduction

and rape by Sekar could be recorded on the sole evidence

of PW2. Undoubtedly, the testimony of victim of sexual

assault stands at par with testimony of an injured witness,

and is entitled to great weight. Therefore, corroboration for

the testimony of the victim would not be insisted upon

provided the evidence does not suffer from any basic

infirmities and the probability factors do not render it

unworthy of credence. This Court in Rameshwar Vs.

29 State of Rajasthan5 declared that corroboration is not the

sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the

aforesaid case, Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court

observed as follows:-

"The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge, ... The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand."

The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this

Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These

observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can

be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim

provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or

improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence.

46. In our opinion, the evidence of PW2 does not satisfy the

aforesaid test. The High Court erroneously concluded that

the girl had not willingly gone with Sekar. The conclusion

5 (1952) SCR 377 30 could only be recorded by ignoring the entire evidence with

regard to the conduct of the girl from the time of the

alleged abduction till the time of the alleged recovery. We

have noticed earlier that she did not make any complaint

on so many occasions when she had the opportunity to do

so. We may, however, notice that even after the alleged

marriage, the girl continued to be a willing partner in the

entire episode. Even if the prosecution version is accepted

in its totality, it would be established that the girl was

staying with Sekar (A1) from 31st July, 1993 till 10th

August, 1993. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated

that Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house

and told him that he had married her. They had come to

see Trichy and requested a house to stay. This witness

categorically stated that he thought that they were newly

married couple. He had made them stay in door no. 86 of

the Police Colony, which was under his responsibility. On

10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there

at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1) had

married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The

girl, according to the prosecution, was recovered from the

aforesaid premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was

31 staying with Sekar (A1). She did not raise any protest.

She did not even complain to this witness or any other

residents in the locality. Her behavior of not complaining to

anybody at any of the stages after being allegedly abducted

would be wholly unnatural. Earlier also, she had many

opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made no

such effort. It is noteworthy that she made no protest on

seeing some known persons near the car, after her alleged

abduction. She did not make any complaint at the

residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti. Again,

there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly

assembled at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no

steps at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied

around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help

even though a car was available. She made no complaint

when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru

Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there

was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police

station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the

Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been married.

The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who

had been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual

32 intercourse.

47. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion

that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable

doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had

been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story

has been concocted for reasons best known to the

prosecution.

48. In our opinion, the conclusions recorded by both the

courts below are wholly perverse. The appellants are

clearly entitled to the benefit of doubt. In view of the above,

the appeals are allowed. All the appellants are acquitted.

They are directed to be released forthwith.

...................................J. [B.Sudershan Reddy]

......................................J. [Surinder Singh Nijjar] New Delhi January 18, 2011.

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