A. Karunanithi vs The State Represented by Inspector of Police

2025 INSC 967 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9964 OF 2019

A. KARUNANITHI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7442 OF 2019)

P. KARUNANITHI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SNEHA DAS Date: 2025.08.12 17:44:20 IST Reason: 1

3. The Special Court under the Prevention of Corruption Act,

19881 in Special Case No. 2 of 2011 vide judgment and

order dated 23.11.2011 convicted accused No. 1 and

accused No. 2, namely, A. Karunanithi and P. Karunanithi

respectively under Section 13 and Section 7 of the Act.

A-1 was awarded three years RI with fine of Rs. 10,000/-

under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act

and 2 years RI with fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 7 of

the Act and in the event of non-payment of fine with SI of

3 months each. Similarly, A-2 was awarded sentence of

1.5 years of RI with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section

13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act and 1 year RI

with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 7 of the Act and in

the event of default in payment of fine with SI of 3 months

each.

4. The aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and

sentence was challenged by both the accused persons

independently by separate appeals before the High Court.

Both the appeals were decided by the High Court by a

common judgment and order dated 05.12.2018 and were

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ 2 dismissed. Thus, the conviction and sentence awarded by

the trial court was upheld.

5. The above common judgment and order passed by the

High Court is under challenge in the present appeals.

6. A-1 was serving as Village Administrative Officer at

Selvalur and A-2 was working as a Village Assistant in the

same office. The complainant, V. Rengasamy (PW-2) had

applied to the Tehsildar for a Community Certificate for the

purposes of joining Government service. His application

was returned with an endorsement to approach A-1 for a

report. When the complainant approached A-1 on

09.11.2004, he allegedly demanded Rs. 500/- as a bribe

for processing the papers. The complainant approached A-

1 again on 27.11.2004 whereupon he reiterated his

demand as aforesaid.

7. Subsequently, the complainant lodged a complaint with

the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption

Corruption Department with regard to demand of Rs.

500/- as a bribe by A-1. A trap was arranged on

03.12.2004 where currency notes were treated with

phenolphthalein powder and given to the complainant.

After the trap was laid, the complainant approached A-1 3 again, whereupon he reiterated his demand for Rs. 500/-

as bribe and instructed A-2 to collect the money. The

complainant handed the marked currency notes to A-2

who counted the same and kept it, as directed by A-1. On

the signal of the complainant, Police entered, seized the

currency notes and conducted the phenolphthalein test on

the hands of A-2 which turned pink, confirming contact

with the pre-treated currency notes. The seized currency

notes were sent for chemical analysis which confirmed that

they contained phenolphthalein.

8. It was in this background, the criminal machinery was set

into motion and an FIR Crime No. 8 of 2004 was registered

under the Act. Upon investigation, a chargesheet was

submitted on 29.06.2006 under Section 7 and Section

13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act citing 11

witnesses. Thereafter, the trial commenced and both the

accused were found guilty and sentenced, which judgment

and order was affirmed by the High Court.

9. Shri S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for the

appellants argued for the reduction of sentence to A-1 and

for setting aside conviction of A-2. He submitted that the

High Court failed to consider that the age of A-1 is 68 years 4 and that he was involved in a case pertaining to a petty

amount of Rs.500/- as bribe and that too in the year 2004.

Therefore, keeping in mind the time elapsed and the small

amount of the bribe, the sentence imposed upon him is

excessive and it could be reduced to the statutory

minimum sentence of one year.

10. In context with A-2, he submitted that his conviction is

illegal in the absence of evidence that there was demand of

illegal gratification by him or that he was present when

A-1 originally demanded the bribe. Therefore, unless there

is demand and receipt of the bribe, he cannot be convicted.

11. A further argument was raised by him that A-2 cannot be

convicted for merely accepting the money as there was no

specific charge of abetment or allegation that A-1 was the

abettor of the crime.

12. In defence, counsel for the State had submitted that the

case stands duly proved against A-1 by the oral evidence

of PW-1 (Revenue Divisional Officer) and PW-2

(complainant). The Courts have repeatedly emphasised

that the punishment under the Act ought to be deterrent

in order to maintain public trust and prevent corruption.

5 Therefore, no leniency should be shown to A-1 by reducing

the punishment.

13. It has also been submitted that offence has also been

proved against A-2 as he had accepted the illegal

gratification on behalf of the A-1. He had knowingly

accepted the money on behalf of A-1. He was aware that it

was a bribe money. He had a fair trial, therefore, the

absence of a formal charge of abetment would not vitiate

his conviction.

14. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Neeraj Datta vs

State (NCT of Delhi)2 has held that for recording a

conviction under Section 7 and Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii)

of the Act, the prosecution has to prove the demand and

acceptance of illegal gratification either by direct evidence

which can be in the nature of oral evidence or

documentary evidence or circumstantial evidence. In other

words, to convict a person under the aforesaid provision

demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua

non.

2 (2023) 4 SCC 731 6

15. We first take up the case of A-2. It is no one’s case that A-

2 ever demanded any illegal gratification. He undoubtedly

accepted the money on the directions of A-1 and kept the

same with him. So, there was no demand of illegal

gratification on his part. The demand made by A-1 cannot

be attributed to A-2 as no evidence was adduced which

could establish that A-2 was a habitual offender working

in aid with A-1 or was facilitating A-1 in demanding and

receiving illegal gratification. Accordingly, in the absence

of any allegation or evidence that A-2 demanded bribe from

the complainant or he was acting in connivence with A-1,

he cannot be prosecuted for the commission of the crime

of demanding and receiving illegal gratification.

16. Admittedly, A-2 was not charged with the abetment of the

aforesaid crime. He had accepted the money on the

direction of A-1 only. He could have received the money

innocently on the direction of A-1 or he may have received

it knowingly. Both the views are possible. However, as no

evidence was adduced to prove that both of them have

connived to demand and accept the bribe, even if a fair trial

may have been given to the A-2, it cannot be said with any

certainty that he was an accomplice to the crime. 7 Accordingly, in the absence of charge of abetment and the

proof of connivance between A-1 and A-2, we are of the

opinion that A-2 could not have been convicted.

17. In Mahendra Singh Chotelal Bhargad vs. State of

Maharashtra & ors.3, this Court had an occasion to deal

with the case where the bribe was demanded by one

person and was accepted and recovered from a third

person. The conviction of the said third person was set

aside, holding that accepting money on behalf of another

person may certainly constitute an abetment of an offence,

but in the absence of a charge of abetment, the person

accepting the bribe is not liable to be convicted.

Accordingly, the Trial Court as well as High Court

manifestly erred in convicting him for an offence under

Section 7 and 13 of the Act.

18. Now, coming to the conviction of A-1. The evidence on

record amply proves that he demanded bribe from the

complainant not only once but twice, and thereafter when

the trap was laid. The bribe on his behalf was accepted by

A-2. The evidence proves that A-2 accepted the money on

3 (1998) 2 SCC 357 8 the dictates of A-1. Therefore, both the ingredients of

demand and receipt stand duly proved against A-1. The

evidence in this regard of PW-1 and PW-2, despite some

minor contradictions stand unshaken. Therefore, in our

opinion, his conviction as held by the Trial Court and

affirmed by the High Court is not liable to be interfered

with.

19. The submission that the imposition of the punishment of

three years RI and two years RI respectively for the offences

under Section 13(1) read with Section 13(2) and under

Section 7 of the Act upon A-1 is harsh and ought to be

reduced to the minimum of one year on the basis of the

age of the A-1 and on account of the petty amount of Rs.

500/- involved in the bribe.

20. There is no dispute to the fact that the offence was

allegedly committed in the year 2004 and it involved a

small amount of Rs. 500/-. A-1 had suffered on account of

the pendency of the trial and appeal for all these years. The

long time that has elapsed during the trial and the appeals

coupled with the fact that the amount involved is small, it

appears just and proper to award the minimum sentence

prescribed under the Act.

9

21. The argument that the Court cannot show compassion to

reduce the sentence by exercising powers under Article

142 of the Constitution is misconceived as the Court is not

showing leniency by overriding or going beyond the

statutory provisions. The reduction of sentence is within

the scope of the statute which provides for a minimum

sentence of one year.

22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we

confirm the conviction of A-1 but reduce his sentence from

three and two years respectively to the minimum of one

year for both the offences as prescribed under the Act. The

judgment and order of the High Court as regards A-1

stands modified accordingly and his appeal is allowed in

part.

23. The judgment and order of the Trial Court and the High

Court insofar they convict A-2 are set aside. His appeal

stands allowed.

.……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.……………………………….. J.

(PRASANNA B. VARALE) NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12, 2025 10